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CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

## The Support Services Historical Series

THE OFFICE OF LOGISTICS -- AN OVERVIEW  
1945-70

**Secret**

OL-14

July 1972

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
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THE SUPPORT SERVICES HISTORICAL SERIES

OL-14

THE OFFICE OF LOGISTICS -- AN OVERVIEW  
1945-70

*by*



July 1972

25X1



John F. Blake  
Director of Logistics

HISTORICAL STAFF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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## FOREWORD

This history is a summary of the growth and development of the logistics function in the Central Intelligence Agency. It is designed to pull together and place in perspective the wide variety of responsibilities and activities described in detail in the separate histories of the line divisions of the Office of Logistics (OL). For a complete list of historical studies of OL components, see Appendix C.

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## The Office of Logistics -- An Overview

1945-70

### I. Introduction

This history covers some 25 years and carries events within the Office of Logistics (OL) through 1970. This period, which includes the brief lifespans of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), encompasses virtually the entire existence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, in some instances, may be too recent to be truly considered as history. It is possible, however, to obtain a certain perspective into the birth and growth of the logistical activities of the Agency, which makes the effort of telling this history worthwhile.

Viewing the events of the past 25 years, a pattern soon becomes evident. During the first 8 years (1945-53) there was tremendous growth, with its attendant confusion both within the Agency and within its logistical support mechanisms. Procedures

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were loosely defined or nonexistent, and responsibilities were fragmented between the dominant components -- the Office of Special Operations (OSO) and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). By 1953, efforts at consolidation had succeeded -- again within the Agency through the melding of OPC and OSO under the umbrella of the Clandestine Services (CS) and through the establishment of the Logistics Office having sole responsibility for supplying all components of CIA.

The 17 or so years that followed the consolidation of the CS and the logistics function were marked initially by a high degree of centralization followed by a gradual trend towards decentralization -- a pendulum effect that can be exemplified by the method of accounting for property. Initially, nonexpendable property was defined as nonconsumable property costing \$10 or more per item. By 1970, nonexpendable property, while still considered nonconsumable, had to cost \$200 or more to be included in this category. The reader will discern other examples of the loosening of controls initially installed in the early 1950's -- the obvious conclusion is that the Agency logistics element had attained a balance, a long-sought maturity.

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## II. The Formative Years, 1945-53

From September 1945 to September 1947, the national intelligence community was in a state of flux. With the cessation of World War II, the dismantlement of the military forces, including the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), commenced, impelled by the fervor of a war-weary populace. Before all the assets of OSS were liquidated, President Truman issued an Executive Order -- effective 10 October 1945 -- establishing the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and transferring all elements of OSS -- except those absorbed by the Departments of Army, Navy, and State -- to the new organization.1/\* Barely 4 months later, on 22 January 1946, a new Presidential Directive created the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and vested in that body the authority to establish the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).2/ By 1 November 1946, SSU property assets had been absorbed by CIG.3/ A problem common to both these organizations was their forced reliance upon other Government agencies, primarily the

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\*For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.

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Departments of War, Navy, and, to a lesser degree, State for operating funds and personnel. Neither SSU nor CIG was independently funded by Congress.\* It was the opinion of CIG's General Counsel that CIG had no official power "to take personnel action, to certify payrolls, to authorize travel and to procure supplies."<sup>4/</sup> Supplies and equipment were obtained in two primary ways: either directly from existing War Department stocks or with confidential funds made available to the CIG by other Government agencies.

The organizational confusion was resolved with the phaseout of the CIG and the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The 80th Congress, in Public Law 253 (National Security Act), signed on 26 July 1947, established the CIA. The National Security Act became effective on 18 September 1947.

A. Period of Transition: SSU to CIG to CIA

While the outline presented above tends to indicate

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\*This situation was not completely rectified until the enabling legislation, commonly referred to as the CIA Act of 1949, became law on 20 June 1949.

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turmoil, the logistics functions actually remained relatively stable. The Procurement and Supply Branch (P&S)\* (see Figure 1) functioned as the SSU logistics element. The broken lines on Figure 1 indicate those elements whose existence was deemed temporary. On 1 October 1945 P&S had a personnel strength of

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██████████ a figure that steadily declined. A year later, under CIG

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██████████ the number of personnel performing logistics functions had

██████████ dropped █████ with the phaseout of the temporary elements of

P&S.<sup>5/</sup> During its short lifespan P&S processed some 2,698

procurement requests with a dollar value of \$160,324. The

Surplus Property Section disposed of \$3 million worth of surplus

equipment, and the Contract Termination Section terminated 69

contracts and obtained favorable settlement of 67 others.<sup>\*\*6/</sup>

When the logistics structure of SSU was absorbed by CIG in October 1946, the organization and mission remained

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
\*Page 6

\*\*Precise statistical data for this period are not easily obtainable, and the reliability of those available is questionable. Statistics presented in this paragraph are cited as examples of activity and do not necessarily indicate the total activity of the element.

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Figure 1

Organizational Chart  
Strategic Services Unit -- Procurement and Supply Branch  
October 1945



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unchanged, with the exception that the Contract Termination and Surplus Property Sections were eliminated. The primary functions of the unit included procurement, supply and warehousing, maintenance of buildings, operation of a telephone section, a central mail room, and a central courier office. On 22 November 1946 the Personnel and Administration Branch was established.<sup>7/</sup> A subordinate element of this branch was the Services Division, which took over the personnel and the functions of the defunct P&S Branch. The Services Division retained the P&S Branch missions and added to these the responsibilities for printing, reproduction, and the translation of foreign language documents to meet the requirements of CIG. <sup>\*8/</sup> Figure 2\*\* shows the organizational structure of the Services Division.

On 18 June 1947 the Personnel and Administration Branch

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
\*The printing and reproduction functions are understandable support missions, but how the responsibility for translating foreign documents came to be placed under this division is something of a mystery. To muddy the water even further, the organizational chart available for the period reflects the Translation Section, but the corresponding Table of Organization (T/O) does not reflect a personnel strength for this section. Efforts to validate the existence and/or rationale for the Translation Section have come to a dead end in every instance.

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Figure 2

Organizational Chart  
Central Intelligence Group  
November 1946



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was renamed the Executive for Administration and Management -- to become effective 1 July -- and the Services Division -- now to be the Services Branch -- along with other support elements, became a part of this newly created office. 9/ In CIG parlance, a division was subordinate to a branch, so this change in nomenclature was indicative of the growing importance of the logistical function. Concurrently, the Translation Section disappeared and a new division was added -- Central Records -- which was responsible for records management, top secret control, administrative files, and mail and courier service.

Heretofore the logistical effort had been concentrated in the metropolitan area -- supplying the demands of the headquarters elements. It now became clear that to truly support CIG a reorientation was necessary. Support -- in terms of supplies and equipment -- was required on a global basis. To gain a perspective into the activities of the period, it must be remembered that the Office of Special Operations (OSO) was the major operating component within CIG. Operations were primarily of the Foreign Intelligence (FI) type, and the days of large-scale paramilitary (PM) activity were still in the future. National policy was often

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unsettled, and the lack of direction was reflected in the operations of CIG. In the field, case officers had great latitude in administration. They rented safehouses as required, often purchased required supplies and equipment with cash, and were able, on an individual basis, to obtain support from local representatives of

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[redacted]

At this point in time, the final reorganization -- in a national sense -- occurred. The National Security Act of 1947 was implemented, and CIG became CIA on 18 September 1947. The logistics structure was essentially untouched by this change except that the Services Branch lost its Central Records Division.

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The branch had grown in personnel to [redacted] -- with a T/O of [redacted] -- and consisted of the Office of the Chief, and Supply, Property, Reproduction, Travel, and Transportation Sections. 10/

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B. CIA's Logistic System

The next few years were marked by numerous internal organizational changes. At its birth CIA was a relatively small organization consisting of less than [redacted] people, and it had an

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\*This paragraph is a summary of the impressions received during discussions with those who had been on board during this early era.

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operating budget of some [redacted] \* A constant search for the correct balance between the operational elements and the support elements began late in 1948. The major share of the logistics function was being performed by the Services Branch, but it is important to note that OSO also contained a logistics support unit in the form of its Project Support Branch -- later called the Transportation and Supply Division. The catalyst, both for the Agency and its support elements, was the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) on 1 September 1948. 11/ Vested with the mission of countering Communism by the use of "dirty tricks," OPC was originally autonomous and merely attached to CIA for administrative purposes. 12/ With both OSO and OPC in operation there was duplication and diffusion of the logistics effort throughout the Agency, to say nothing of the divergence of opinion over how the support function should be organized.

Generally the operational elements felt strongly that to be fully responsive OPC and OSO each required an organic support element and further that support elements should be

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\*The exact figures, while available, are still classified TS (as of May 1972). Precise figures may be found in "Report of Survey" by Messrs. [redacted] 10 May 1955. HS/HC 526 (TS)

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compartmented into covert and overt functions. With the creation of OPC the Agency was about to embark on operations on a much more grandiose scale than many had anticipated. In the first 4 years of its existence the Agency grew from a relatively small organization to one having more than [redacted] and an operating budget well in excess of [redacted] - for FY 1953 some 71 percent of this money was for OPC operations.\*

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1. Organization of Logistics Support

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While the operational components were plumping for organic support units, Agency management, in its first major organizational effort, placed the responsibility for support under the CIA Executive. 14/ The reorganization, decreed on 14 September 1948 by General Order [redacted] provided that effective 1 December the Executive for Administration and Management (A&M) was to be abolished, together with its Personnel, Services, Budget and Finance, and Management Branches. Implementation of the

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\*Again, imprecise figures are used because of the TS classification of the source. Personnel figures are taken from the source quoted in the footnote on p. 11 above. Budgetary figures are available in the Office of Comptroller, "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities--CIA and Predecessor Organizations," 20 September 1945 through 23 January 1952, (TS) HS/HC 36, Item 2.

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reorganization was delayed, but on 31 December 1948 abolition of the Executive for A&M was confirmed along with abolition of its branches. The former branch chiefs now became functional officers. Thus the Chief of the Services Branch of A&M became the Services Officer under the CIA Executive.15/ At the same time that this change occurred OSO lost its own logistics support element -- the Transportation and Supply Division -- which was replaced by covert counterparts in the new Services Office.16/ (See Figure 3.\*)

The organization, as outlined in Figure 3, lasted barely 10 months when it was superseded by another change. On 1 October 1949 the Services Office per se was abolished, and the overt and covert functions were made separate staffs -- still responsible to the CIA Executive.17/ (See Figure 4.\*\*)

The Services Division of each staff was a self-contained logistical support group. On 5 October 1949, only 4 days after it was scheduled to become effective, the Overt Support Staff was renamed the Administrative Staff, and the Covert Support Staff

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
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Figure 3

Organization of Services Office  
January 1949




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Figure 4

Organization of Overt and  
Covert Support Staffs  
October 1949



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became the Special Support Staff. 18/ Each staff inherited the divisions from its predecessors, and in addition the Administrative Staff picked up the Medical Division (see Figure 5\*).

Figures 4 and 5 provide ample evidence that the philosophy concerning compartmentation was being observed. The operational components, however, were disturbed by the organization because the support elements were reporting to the CIA Executive -- the number-three man in the Agency hierarchy. In a history of the period, [redacted] says:

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The Chief of the Special Support Staff reported directly to the Executive, CIA. Thus while recognizing the need for separate facilities for the covert offices, General Order No. [redacted] placed command of these covert facilities in the Executive, CIA, leaving the covert offices, and especially OPC, without any direct control over the resources upon which it was dependent for its existence and operations. The policy guidance as to scale and magnitude of operations given OPC by the Departments of State and Defense, to which OPC attempted to respond, was not recognized by the CIA Special Support Staff elements. Thus, the office [OPC] was in the position of receiving its mission on a large scale from one source and its means on a limited scale from another unrelated and uncoordinated source. 19/


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Figure 5

Organization of Administrative and  
Special Support Staff  
October 1949



OPC did, however, have a quasi-logistics system of its own. Staff III of OPC was an administrative unit, and among its other functions it was charged with providing for "OPC Headquarters services and supply needs; develops and implements policies and procedures related thereto." 20/ Staff II of OPC contained a Materiel Branch whose mission was:

Advises and assists in the development and formulation of OPC materiel (services, supplies, and equipment, exclusive of ammunitions and equipment and special devices) requirements and the acquisition of materiel\* necessary to the implementation of plans and projects in locations other than Headquarters. 21/

The OPC unit grew, and by 1951 it was called the Administration and Logistics (A&L) Staff with a T/O of  of whom  were assigned to the Logistics Division and  to the General Services Division. 22/ That there was a division of responsibilities between the Special Support Staff and OPC's own support elements is evident; but to make matters worse, this division of responsibility, always confusing and often inefficient, led finally to friction between the two elements. The primary bone of contention seems to have been which element should properly deal with

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\* Emphasis added.

DOD and the Armed Services. OPC, because of its quasi-military type mission and the large number of military officers assigned to the office, acquired extensive contacts among the services.

This dispute surfaced in 1950 when Andrew E. Van Esso, then Chief of the Procurement Office -- a later reorganization of the Special Support Staff -- attempted to consolidate sole responsibility for all acquisition of supplies and equipment in the Procurement Office. In a memorandum to the ADPC, his Special Support Assistant (SSA), Colonel [redacted] summarized Van Esso's position:

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Van Esso reiterated his request that OPC stop dealing with JSPD on matters of supply and that OPC recognize his office as the sole point of contact with the military services and others for the procurement of materiel. 23/

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[redacted] informed Van Esso that OPC would be happy to submit requests for supplies that it would normally expect to receive through CIA channels to his office but that OPC would expect that requirements that arose as a result of joint planning with the various military staffs must be worked out as best suited each individual case. [redacted] assured Van Esso that OPC would do its best to prevent duplication of requirements that might

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arise as a result of OPC work with the military services on war

planning. \*24/ One day later [redacted] fired off another memoran-

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25X1A [redacted] dum to the ADPC, [redacted] on the same subject. [redacted]

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[redacted] had seen a memorandum proposed by Van Esso for the DCI's

signature that would require all Agency requirements for materiel

requested from the military to pass through a central point --

Van Esso's Procurement Office. Noting that the DCI had recently

complimented the US Air Force (USAF) as having

contributed materially to the accomplishment by this Agency of certain of its objectives. The high priority which you are according such support is greatly appreciated. 25/

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[redacted] rejoinder was:

The 'high-priority' referred to in this paragraph is the priority afforded to OPC because of its peculiar relationship to the Air Force and is not the priority accorded to CIA as such. To have OPC priority placed in the same category with agency-wide priority would mean in effect substantial lessening of the support which OPC now enjoys. 26/

Problems such as the one described above were not finally

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\*OPC was responsible for all war planning, running the gamut from guerrilla to 'hot war.'

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resolved until the formation of the CS in 1952 and the subsequent centralization of all logistics functions in 1954. Another unfortunate result of such maneuverings was the lack of confidence many of the operational elements had in the Agency logistics system as it then existed.

On 1 December 1950, the CIA Executive became the Deputy Director for Administration (DDA). As part of this reorganization, the Administrative and Special Support Staffs were replaced by the Administrative Services Office and the Procurement Office -- on equal levels.<sup>27/</sup> (See Figure 6. \*)

As Figure 6 shows, the logistics functions remained divided between two independent offices. The division of responsibilities was based on putting purely administrative support under one office and planning, procurement, and supply into another separate office. Two more realignments were to occur, but the concept of division of responsibilities was to be retained. A year later, in December 1951, a high-level reorganization occurred, and a new command level was activated -- the Office of General Services. This office had two major components: Administrative


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Figure 6

Organization of Administrative Services  
and Procurement Offices  
December 1950



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Services (formerly the Administrative Services Office) and Organization and Methods Services (formerly the Office of Management Analysis). The Procurement Office remained stable during this reorganization, but on 21 February 1952, 3 months later, another shuffle occurred. The Procurement Office was renamed the Procurement and Supply (P&S) Office, and the governing regulation assigned as its mission:

The Chief of Procurement and Supply is responsible for the procurement, storage, issue, and Agency accountability of all Agency equipment and supplies except as departure therefrom is properly authorized, and for coordination and compilation of requirements of materials required for logistical support. 28/

By August of 1952 P&S began to assume greater responsibilities. On 5 August the transportation function was transferred from the Office of General Services to P&S, exclusive of the motor pool and the trucking function. During that same month a portion of the Real Estate and Construction Division responsibilities, such as engineering support, was transferred to P&S. A chain reaction had been triggered, for in September 1952 the logisticians assigned to OPC's A&L Staff were transferred to P&S. These changes were precursors of those yet to come; and on

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20 March 1953 the Logistics Office was activated, assuming the mantle from P&S. 29/

Before the Logistics Office came into being, however, there was a protracted struggle among the operational elements to retain their various autonomies -- from each other and from the rest of the Agency. From the creation of OPC in September 1948 until General Smith's decree of 1 August 1952 effecting a merger of OSO and OPC under the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), logistics and other support activities were dispersed, duplicated, and decentralized at the whim of the operational managers. The development of an effective centralized support program would, in fact, be a continuing point of friction between the Deputy Director for Administration (DDA\*) and the Clandestine Services until well into the 1960's, \*\* and the history of logistics developments was one of the principal features of that story.

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\* Established 1 December 1950, this Directorate became the Deputy Directorate for Support (DDS) on 3 February 1955.

\*\*As noted later in this paper, the question of centralization vs decentralization of support functions was less of an "either-or" proposition by the end of the 1960's than it had been in earlier years. Pragmatists, bearing the results of cost-effectiveness studies, demonstrated the need for flexibility in support -- including logistics support -- for operations.


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2. Support for Operations

It is difficult to ferret out examples of operational support during the SSU-CIG era. As far as can be ascertained, operations were on a small scale and consisted of FI activities, which do not usually require large-scale logistical support. As mentioned previously, the creation of OPC in September 1948 was a catalyst that spurred the growth of both CIA and its logistical elements. The major projects of this era were triggered by the Chinese Communist takeover on the mainland and the Korean War. Two major projects born during the early 1950's had much to do with the decision to develop the

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
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While it is true that neither of these projects ever actually achieved much from an operational standpoint, both had a tremendous impact on the logistical elements. Instead of requiring a few typewriters and other miscellaneous equipment, these projects put the logistical function in the big time as evidenced by a memorandum to the Comptroller from Colonel

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[redacted] Chief of the FE Division. \*\* [redacted] pointed out that the Project Review Committee (PRC)\*\*\* had authorized

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[redacted] for FE/OPC activities. Of this amount, [redacted]

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\*It is also interesting to note that [redacted] was essentially an OPC project while [redacted] was sponsored by OSO.

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[redacted]  
\*\*\*The PRC was responsible for approving projects conceptually as well as for approving funds.

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[redacted] His trip report

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summarized his findings:

It is the opinion of the undersigned that the present system of procurement is functioning with exceptional efficiency, and barring unforeseen security breaks, it is recommended that the present procedure continue to the extent required by operational needs. 39/

Changes were made, nevertheless, and it was at this time that

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[redacted] a staff employee from the Office of Scientific

Intelligence of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence (DDI), was

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[redacted] constructed at a cost in excess of [redacted] was

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throughout the period of this history the major Agency support

base in the FE area; and in terms of size, activity, and longevity

it exceeded any base ever developed by the Agency overseas.\*

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Neither [redacted] lasted long as support and opera-  
tional bases.

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[redacted]

Within CONUS the problem of facilities was somewhat  
different. In the metropolitan Washington area -- in the early  
days it was termed the "departmental" area -- the emphasis was  
in obtaining office space and storage facilities. \*\*\*

From the outset the answer appeared to be to obtain one  
large facility to house all Agency operations, and on 31 March

---

\*As this is written (1972), the [redacted] has orders to  
disengage from support activity, and by 1 July 1972 only a residual  
force will remain.

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[redacted]  
\*\*\*See Table 1, page 36.

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Table 1

Space Facilities Required by CIA  
1948-53 46/

<u>Year</u>	<u>Space Occupied a/</u>	<u>Number of Buildings</u>
1948	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
1949	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
1950	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
1951	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
1953	[Redacted]	[Redacted]

a. Net square feet.

1947 the DCI, Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, requested of the Public Buildings Service (PBS) "that CIG be assigned a single, permanent, fireproof building having a minimum capacity

[Redacted] "47/ Such requests were repeated

frequently over the years without success until Congress on

15 July 1955 -- Public Law 161, 84th Congress -- authorized \$46 million for a CIA building.

In addition to finding space for people, the logistical support elements had to have warehouse space. Until 1953 the headquarters logistical functions were conducted out of [Redacted]

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As mentioned earlier the most vital legislation affecting the Agency was the CIA Act of 1949 -- Public Law 110, 81st Congress, 20 June 1949 -- for it gave the Agency a budgetary and fiscal stability that had hitherto been lacking. Before the passage of PL 110 the lack of specific enabling legislation had necessitated that the DCI depend on delegations from the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Navy and on verbal and somewhat tenuous understandings with the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congress and other Government agencies as to the purposes for which available funds could legally and properly be expended. There were, of course, many aspects to this act, but analyzed from the standpoint of its impact upon the logistical elements, the act provided the following authorities:

1. Extended to CIA certain authority in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 relating to negotiation of purchases and contracts for supply without advertising\* under certain conditions;

2. Exempted the CIA from certain statutory restrictions on the amount that can be paid for rent of quarters and the amount that can be expended for alterations;

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\*Emphasis added.

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3. Provided broad authority for transfers between the CIA and other Government departments and agencies of such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB);\*

4. Provided authority for exchange of funds without regard to Section 3651 of the Revised Statutes (31 USC 543);\*\*

5. Provided for the expenditure of funds for certain purposes without regard to requirements of existing law or Comptroller General decisions which specify that such expenditures are not permissible unless authorized by law; and for the expenditure of certain funds solely on the certification of the DCI. \*\*\*

The authorities provided in the act thus gave the Agency a latitude, especially in the field of procurement, that it sorely needed.

Parallel actions that were to complement the authorities provided by the CIA Act of 1949 were the support agreements reached with other Government agencies. One of the earliest recorded agreements was concluded in 1949 between the DCI and

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[redacted] This particular agreement appears

\*Now (1972) termed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

\*\*This exemption allows CIA to convert US dollars, gold, and silver into foreign currencies and the use of such currencies for payment in kind.

\*\*\*Emphases added.

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in CIA and the apparent internal jurisdictional conflict in CIA concerning procurement responsibility and authority resulted in undesirable liaison with excessive numbers of people, conflicting claims to CIA procurement authority, and conflicting correspondence channels.

(6) Priority ratings, planning of [redacted] requirements, and the security of handling shipments were jeopardized by the generally chaotic situation.

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Recommendations:

(1) CIA should place its house in order by firmly placing procurement responsibility and authority in a single office and by designating specific liaison points and communications channels.

(2) The present dual authorities under which CIA is receiving logistics support from [redacted] should be replaced with a single new authority. 53/

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It is interesting to note that both recommendations made

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[redacted] and the creation of an independent

Logistics Office in that same year provided the single point of

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[redacted]

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when needed to effect the transport of Agency supplies and equipment; and GSA directs and coordinates the design, engineering, construction, maintenance, and repair requirements of Agency properties within the Washington metropolitan area,

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The techniques used in the acquisition of supplies and equipment were refined during this early period. Interagency support agreements were formalized, and the method of procurement and funding also underwent a change. From 1946 to 1952

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That logisticians were routinely excluded from the planning

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phase of operations is demonstrated by the following excerpt from a memorandum to the ADPC from his executive officer:

OPC welcomes all possible assistance from the Support Staff but is fearful to accept this assistance unless assurance can be given that operational details will not be passed through the entire administrative hierarchy.

Through the use of these Logistics Support Officers, it is believed that we will be able to use the CIA Support Staff personnel much more effectively. We further believe that due to the extremely sensitive nature of our operations, this is the most effective way of "cutting-in" [redacted] [Chief, Special Support Staff] and far preferable to their attempting to participate in regular planning conferences. 55/

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Over the years, the attitude expressed in the quotation above gradually diminished as faith in the Agency's support system grew. One technique that was developed was the use of

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[redacted] The implementation of this and other refinements allowed the Agency to procure more items openly or through GSA, and by 1953 only those procurements in which the interest of the USG had to be concealed were part of the covert procurement program. 56/

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III. The Office of Logistics -- Coming of Age

A. Organization and Mission

The publication of CIA Regulation No.  on 20 March 1953 was the turning point in the history of Logistics. The mission paragraph of this Regulation stated:

The Chief of Logistics is responsible for the procurement, distribution, and accountability of Agency equipment and supplies, for transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies; for meeting real estate and construction needs, except for securing space assignments through the General Services Administration in the metropolitan area of Washington, D. C.; and for the coordination and compilation of forecasts of requirements for Agency logistical support.

Although some overlap of logistical functions between the new Logistics Office and OGS continued to exist, it was short lived.\*

A totality had been created and the problems faced by the new office were many. (See Figure 7 -- Organization. \*\*)

Standard procedures for property accountability were

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\*The OGS was dissolved on 15 February 1954.


\*\*Page 47.

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Figure 7

Organization of the Logistics Office  
March 1953



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nonexistent, stock control was being performed manually, financial accountability procedures had to be developed in conjunction with the Comptroller, and logistics procedures had not been formally promulgated -- these were the major problems faced by the newly created office.<sup>57/</sup> Careful analysis of the mission statement contained in Regulation No.  reveals another important function -- that of forecasting requirements for Agency logistical support. It must be realized that virtually all expertise in logistics functions had been stripped from the Area Divisions and Staffs of the DDP when the A&L Staff of OPC was liquidated. It was of paramount importance to both logistics and the operations personnel that the planning functions continue to be performed by the Coordination and Requirements Staff but by July 1954 the need for this Staff had diminished. The prime reason for this was the fact that the Logistics Career Board\* had introduced trained logistics personnel into the staffs of the operational elements of the Agency, and these individuals provided the point

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\*The Logistics Career Board was established by CIA Regulation No.  25 May 1953. The Board was charged with the career planning, development, promotion, and assignment of Logistics career designees throughout the Agency.

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of contact between the operational element they represented and  
"Main Log."

The other problems enumerated above were resolutely  
attacked and solutions found. By early 1953 the Supply Division  
was operating three warehouse facilities

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and the manual stock record system simply could not cope with  
the volume. In October 1952 the conversion of stock records to  
machine language had begun in order to utilize electronic account-  
ing machines, commonly referred to as an EAM system. This  
conversion was completed in February 1953. The Financial  
Analysis Number (FAN) was adopted to interface with the Com-  
ptroller's Office, and this became the basis of the Agency's system  
of financial accounting for property (FPA). These changes in  
turn led to the initiation of an Agency cataloging system of pro-  
fessional quality using the Federal Classification system as the  
basis for its own program. Thus when fiscal year 1954 rolled  
around, the Logistics Office was able to place monetary values  
on Agency assets and be reasonably certain that the figures were  
inclusive and correct -- the dollar value of assets on hand as of

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1 July 1953 totaled more than [redacted] 58/\* The final problem, 25X1A  
that of formally promulgating logistics procedures, took some-  
what longer to solve. Over a two-year period from about mid-  
1953 to mid-1955, however, some 51 [redacted] Headquarters regu- 25X1  
lations were published and distributed covering all facets of the  
logistical operations of the Agency. In addition to the regulatory  
issuances, a series of handbooks was written and published. Four  
basic handbooks were developed for use as procedural guides for  
personnel requesting or requiring logistical support. \*\* As can  
be seen, the Agency and its logistics element were coming of  
age -- and becoming a bureaucracy in the process.

Minor adjustments continued to be made in the structure  
of the Logistics Office -- most coming from the transfer of func-  
tions from the OGS. In December 1953 the motor pool function,

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\*This is a very general treatment of a tremendously complicated subject. Interested readers are referred to source 42 and source 57 for a complete explanation.

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25X9 with  positions, was transferred to the Transportation Division. 59/ In February 1954 the OGS was dissolved and its remaining logistical functions transferred to the Logistics Office; the elements transferred were Printing and Reproduction, Mail Control, and Space, Maintenance, and Facilities. This final consolidation added one new division, Printing and Reproduction, to the Table of Organization (T/O) of the Logistics Office. 60/ The rapid assimilation of these functions ballooned the personnel strength to

25X9 an on-duty figure  operating under a T/O of  25X

Mr. James A. Garrison, Chief of Logistics, was apprehensive lest the sudden influx create inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in the distribution of duties and personnel, and he requested a management survey of the Logistics Office. 61/ As a result of this management survey, the Logistics Office was retitled the Office of Logistics (OL) on 21 July 1954 and organized as shown in Figure 8. \*\*

At the same time, the T/O was reduced to  positions, and the on-duty strength fell slightly to a total of  25X  
James Garrison 25X


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\*See Appendix E for a statistical comparison of the personnel status of the logistics element.

\*\*Page 52.

Figure 8

Organization of the Office of Logistics  
July 1954



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was the driving force behind these efforts to create a strong, effective OL. He joined the Agency on October 1951 as the Acting Chief of the Procurement Office [redacted] as 25X1 25X2 the Chief, P&S in 1952 [redacted] and was made the Chief of Logistics in March 1953. Garrison continued as the Director of Logistics (D/L) until his retirement in September 1964. For more than a dozen years he was, in effect, "Mr. Logistics" and most of the organizational and procedural changes that were effected within OL were conceived in Garrison's fertile mind and implemented by the force of his personality.

Fluctuations in the organizational structure continued to occur, dictated primarily by mission requirements and refinements in management techniques. The Printing and Reproduction Division was renamed the Printing Services Division (PSD) on 13 June 1955. Also in 1955 the planning for the new Headquarters building had become such a burden on the Real Estate and Construction Division (RECD) that it became necessary to form a separate staff whose sole responsibility was to coordinate all planning for the Langley building. The Building Planning Staff was created in December 1955 and, once its work was completed,

dissolved on 29 June 1962. \*

Two organizational changes were made in 1956 -- the addition of an Executive Officer to the chain of command and the creation of the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division. The formation of the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division was authorized by General Cabell on 14 June 1956. 64/ Its mission was

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The lifespan of this Division as an element of OL was relatively short. The Division and its personnel were transferred to the Development Projects Division of the DDP on 6 March 1959. The other addition, the creation of the position of Executive Officer,

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\*Interestingly enough, such a staff, once presumed dead, was resurrected; and a new Building Planning Staff was given birth on 2 April 1969 to develop a "Master Plan" for the Langley site. 63/ The new staff, although personally approved by the Executive Director-Comptroller, Colonel White, was created with the stipulation that no personnel slots or money would be provided. The staff was formed by detailing personnel to it from other OL and Agency offices. Dr. [redacted] a DDP careerist, was named Chairman of the Staff in June 1969 and continued in that capacity until his retirement on 4 February 1972. He is the source of the information contained herein.

25X9

was more permanent. 65/\* It was created to provide a means of reducing the workload of the Director and Deputy Director, and the Executive Officer was especially charged with providing administrative support and coordinating the efforts of the independent staffs. With these changes OL had six divisions -- the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division, the Procurement Division, the Real Estate and Construction Division, the Transportation Division, the Supply Division, and the Printing Services Division -- and four staffs -- Security, Building Planning, Administrative, and Planning.

Except for the loss of the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division in 1959, the organization of the OL underwent only minor internal shiftings until 1962. Two events combined to result in the formation of the Logistics Services Division. One of these was the completion of the Headquarters Building at Langley. President Eisenhower laid the cornerstone for the building on 3 November 1959, and on the evening of 18 September 1961 Phase One of the move into the new CIA quarters commenced. 66/

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\*This position was effective on 24 October 1956 and continues in existence to date (1972).

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Occupation of this building placed a service requirement upon the OL which, to this date (1972), remains a major function -- often a frustrating and burdensome function. Although GSA was responsible for maintaining the building, that agency often did not or could not respond quickly enough to suit the tenents, and the OL was called upon to accomplish the mission -- telephone service, pneumatic tube, building supply, disposal of classified waste, or trimming the DCI's hedges! Concurrently an Inspector General (IG) Survey of June 1961 recommended a regrouping of units and functions to separate the pure line logistics responsibilities from services such as vehicle maintenance and courier service. 67/ Based on these recommendations and the obvious need to have a responsive unit located in the new building, Colonel White, then the DDS,\* approved the formation of the Logistics Services Division on 5 September 1962. The Division was formally brought into existence on 23 October 1962 with a staff of  personnel and an

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\*CIA Notice  3 Feb 55, formally established the Deputy Director for Support (DDS) and abolished the DDA and the Chief of Administration (COA), DDP. At this time, the DDS had under its control the Offices of Communications, Comptroller, Logistics, Personnel, Security, Training, Audit, General Counsel, Management, and Medical Services.

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annual operating budget of [redacted]

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The ensuing years brought further changes to the organization of the OL, but the turbulent years had passed and forthcoming changes were more deliberate and studied. On 1 March 1965 the Administrative Staff was liquidated, an exercise that was directly related to a reduction in the authorized personnel ceiling of the OL.<sup>69/</sup> The separate elements of the Staff were placed under the direct supervision of the Director of Logistics and his staff, and the command structure of the Administrative Staff ceased to exist. Its Personnel Branch was redesignated the Personnel and Training Staff and reported directly to the D/L. The Budget and Fiscal Branch and the Records and Services Branch were made answerable to the Executive Officer.

The major organizational change of this period occurred on 16 March 1966 when the Transportation Division was dissolved.\* Transportation had continued in existence as a branch, section, or division since the beginning of the Agency, including the days of

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\*The dissolution of this division is interesting because although OL files contain staff studies and proposed Headquarters [redacted] [redacted] announcing the transfer of division functions, no Agency or OL publication was ever issued announcing the demise of the division.

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the SSU and the CIG. The contributions made by this element over the years are too numerous to list in detail, but in addition to the mundane business of supporting the Headquarters administrative transportation requirements, the Transportation Division initiated shipping arrangements with [redacted] opera- 25X1  
ted a fleet of trucks between depots and ports of embarkation, and developed the first Agency program to monitor the acquisition and control of all Agency vehicles. 70/\* The initiation of the TVA program is an excellent example of implementing a management control unquestionably needed and having it turn into a bureaucratic burden. At its inception the program was credited with reducing the vehicular requirements of the Agency by [redacted] vehicles 25X1A with a corresponding savings in equipment investment of some \$500,000. \*\* For the first time, managers had detailed data available showing quantities, location, and intended use of each vehicle

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\*Begun in April 1955, this system was predicated upon the establishment of a Table of Vehicular Allowances (TVA) and remains in existence to date (1972).

\*\*The initial count reflected approximately [redacted] vehicles on Agency records worldwide. The count was made by Mr. Frank [redacted] of the Transportation Division who was dispatched TDY for this express purpose. Over the years this figure has fluctuated and now (1972) stands at approximately [redacted] vehicles. 25X1A 25X1

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acquired by the Agency. Forms were developed for use as "trip tickets"\*\* and for periodic maintenance reports. Regulations were developed that prescribed what options and accessories could be requested; the [redacted] series of regulations still (1972) contain many of these rules. Naturally, some case officers with a penchant for Jaguars and Mercedes-Benz automobiles were unhappy with these regulations. After management had gained a measure of control over the program, it then became a matter of paperwork -- filing the maintenance reports that were forwarded monthly to Headquarters and adjudicating requests for optional equipment or increases in the TVA. As with men and money, requirements always seemed to increase rather than decrease. Upon dissolution of the Transportation Division, this responsibility was transferred to the Supply Division. As the years passed so too did the rigid control of vehicles; delegations of authority were granted to the area divisions and other Agency elements having a TVA, the sending of maintenance forms to Headquarters was discontinued,

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\*Military terminology for a form utilized by drivers of Government vehicles which indicated time-in, time-out, odometer reading, destination, and total mileage driven on a daily basis.

and by the end of the period (1970) the OL was embarked upon a program of returning virtually all responsibility for the TVA's to the operating components and retaining only a computerized central reference file of the status of Agency vehicles. The paramount responsibilities of the Transportation Division -- the transport of people and things -- were divided between OL's Supply Division, which assumed total responsibility for the transport of things, and the Office of Personnel, which through its Central Processing Branch took over the responsibility for the transport of people.

Rounding out the reorganization was the formation of the

25X1A [redacted] designed to provide OL and the Agency with a contracting office capable of dealing with the

25X1A [redacted] Approved by the DDS on 29 June 1959, it began operation on

25 September of that year from facilities located at [redacted]

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25X1A [redacted] Before bringing this section to its conclusion, two other changes in the Agency procurement system are worthy of note. As a result of a study performed in 1966 by an outside management

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firm [redacted] an Agency

Contract Review Board was established in September 1967. As currently constituted (1972) the Board consists of five members, one from each of the Deputy Directors and the DD/L acting as chairman, and its primary responsibilities are to review contracts and contract actions -- normally in the R&D field -- in excess of \$150,000, review cost overruns that exceed \$22,500 and 15 percent, and provide contracting policy upon request. In addition to the regular members, the Board also has advisors assigned from the General Counsel's office and the Office of Finance in addition to the OL Security Office and the Chief of the Procurement Management Staff (PMS). Because of the multidirectorate nature of this Board, it no longer appears on the OL organizational chart. The final element added to the OL structure was the PMS, which was activated on 17 April 1970. 71/ The establishment of this Staff was directly related to the decentralization of the procurement

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25X1A [redacted] Because of its classification [redacted] details are not included in this history. The report is available, however, in the OL Registry.

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contracting efforts begun in 1967. \* The growing maturity and experience of the office allowed management to begin such decentralization without any great concern about its ultimate success.

On 22 August 1967 the D/L delegated contracting-officer authority for R&D contracts to DDP's Technical Services Division (TSD).

This was followed on 1 March 1968 by a similar delegation to the Office of Elint (OEL) of the DDS&T and then on 26 February 1969 to the Office of Research and Development (ORD), also DDS&T, and on the same date to the DDI's National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC). All such contracting officers are SL careerists, and one of the functions of the PMS is to give them a

"home." Specifically, the PMS was designed as a "coordinating mechanism on behalf of all Headquarters contracting units having delegated authority from the Director of Logistics." 73/ The PMS also provides staff supervision over the activities of the

Thus, at the end of the period, the organization of the OL was as

25X1A

\*Historically, the first special procurement authority was granted to Mr. [redacted] Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and Coordination, in 1954. This delegation of authority related specifically to the development of the U-2. 72/

\*\*Until the creation of the PMS, [redacted] was an integral part of the Procurement Division.

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shown in Figure 9.\*

B. Activities and Accomplishments

The period from 1953 through 1970 is replete with examples of the Office's accomplishments. This section will touch on only the most significant, and for definitive studies readers are again referred to the individual histories in the OL series listed in Appendix C.

1. Personnel Staffing


It is axiomatic that a unit is only as good as the personnel assigned to it. Taking this corollary one step further, it follows that even qualified personnel need training and motivation in order to produce to the limits of their capabilities. In short, they require good leadership. One of the first problems was to determine who was a logistian. CIA first established a career service program in 1952, and the then P&SO was directed to form its own career service board. 74/ At this time there was no career service as such; one found a desk and held on. The first career service board managed to sort out and resolve many of

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\*Page 64.

Figure 9

Organization of the Office of Logistics  
31 December 1970



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these problems and became the focal point for transfer and promotion actions until 1964 when the D/L delegated all "action functions" to his Personnel Officer.<sup>75/</sup> From that time, October 1964, until January 1970 only one meeting of the logistics career service board was conducted.<sup>76/</sup> This period coincides with the tour of Mr. George E. Meloon as the D/L and all promotions, transfers, and like personnel actions became the province of the division and staff chiefs with final approval coming personally from Meloon. To characterize OL during this era as a fiefdom of the D/L is not a great exaggeration. With the advent of the newly appointed D/L in January 1970, \* new life was pumped into the career service board; and by the end of the period it, in conjunction with its panels, \*\* was once again operating as an independent advisor to the D/L on career matters. However, when considering the entire period of this report, the fact that no career logistics officer has ever ascended to the position of D/L is a telling summary of OL's career development program.

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\*Mr. John F. Blake

\*\*In 1970 each SL Careerist was assigned a specific job title and assigned to a designated career service panel that was vested with the responsibility for developing each member's career pattern.

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Complicating the staffing problems for the OL are two facts: approximately one-third of its employees are engaged in unskilled or semiskilled service work, and more than another one-third of its careerists are actually working outside the Office in logistics slots that are under the control of other Agency components. In the first instance this has led to a rapid turnover of personnel because of the low grade and menial nature of much of the work. The calibre of individuals available for this type of work has also posed an inordinate number of personnel problems not usually experienced by the other components of the Agency. In the second instance, rotatability of its personnel causes perennial problems. Field stations as well as Headquarters elements must be staffed with career logisticians, and a field station's requirements are often the most difficult to satisfy. An individual once nominated by the D/L must himself accept, and there is often a rejection by the individual for personal or family reasons. Then concurrences must be obtained from both the area division and the station involved, and it is not unusual to get a refusal at either point. Once accepted, the nominee and his family must successfully pass a physical examination. Many are eliminated by this

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step; one reason is that as the average career logistician has been aging, the physical examinations have become increasingly more demanding. After all these hurdles have been passed, the candidate usually gets to the field station -- unless the slot is suddenly cut. In the past few years this has become another factor to contend with. Between mid-1968, when the Balance of Payments (BALPA) reductions began, and the end of the period (December 1970), OL lost some [ ] overseas slots.\*

Reductions in overseas slots came at a time when the Office as a whole was also suffering from cutbacks with no loss of responsibility. The high-water mark in personnel staffing was reached in 1964 when the OL Career Service had an on-duty

strength of [ ]. This figure turned slowly downward in 1965, and by the end of the period the on-duty strength of the Office had

declined to [ ].\*

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\*Such slots are under the control of the respective area division and are subject to reduction or elimination without the approval of

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\*\*Source 75 was used for all figures except the 30 June 1970 statistics, which were obtained from the IBM computer run furnished to OL/P&TS.

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In tandem with the personnel programs, the necessity for training was recognized early in the period. Personnel were absorbed from the logistics staff of OPC and later OGS, and it was, in a sense, a mixed bag. Many were specialists and others had been exposed to only one facet of the logistics operation. In order to develop personnel qualified to perform a variety of functions, whether in "Main Log," an area division, or at a field station, an extensive in-house training program was initiated in 1953. The first running of the 6-week Logistics Support Course began on 9 November 1953 [redacted] The primary objective of the course was to provide training in headquarters and, especially, field supply procedures. The course was designed to augment the experience of personnel destined for overseas assignment and was conducted partially in the headquarters area and partially at [redacted] Attendance increased, and during the first three years that the course was presented [redacted] students attended. The course was changed over the years to meet changing requirements; and in 1966, after the 31st running, it was dropped entirely when the Office of Training (OTR)

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established a comparable course.\* Many other training programs existed and were utilized -- in the words of Mr. James Garrison, D/L\*\* -- to

build up a group of professionals in the field of logistics who would know how to furnish materiels and services to the Agency at the lowest cost, in the most flexible and speedy fashion, and with the maximum of security.77/

What has been achieved over the years is the virtual elimination of the turbulence caused by internal (OL) disorganization to a point where today (1972) such turbulence as exists results from factors outside the Office over which the Office has little influence.

2. Management Decisions

Assuming the existence of a qualified personnel force, the next question is how does such a force receive and carry out a mission. Basically, it responds to management

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\*No record of the total number of students who attended the course during 1953-66 can be located; however,  would be a good estimate.

\*\*D/L from March 1953 to September 1964.

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decisions made by the President and his senior advisors\* which result in programs requiring activity on the part of the Agency.

The personnel force is also, of course, responsive to internal decisions made by individuals in the CIA chain of command.

In previous sections of this history some of these management decisions have been examined; the decentralization of the procurement contracting function is a prime example.

Others in this category include the acquisition and disposal of depots, termination of the large-scale foreign arms acquisition program (discussed in Chapter II), revitalization of the career management system (discussed above), dissolution of elements such as the Transportation Division (discussed in Chapter III), and many others in this vein. These decisions may be mission-related -- for example, ample storage space is required to perform the basic OL mission -- but it is important to understand that such decisions are conscientious efforts, in the absence of outside pressures, to improve the posture of OL in relation to the operational requirements of the Agency.

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\*Including the NSC, the Senior Interdepartmental Groups, the 303 Committee, and other elements of the executive decision-making machinery.

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
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In addition to the consolidation of its depot functions, OL also faced the problem of consolidating its headquarters functions. This took much longer and was not achieved until the late 1960's. The occupation of the new Headquarters building at Langley was touched upon briefly in Chapter II. A capsule version of the history\*\* of the Headquarters building site selection could

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\*See Table 2.

\*\*See source 46.

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simply not do justice to the story. To place this event in perspective, it is important to recall that the initial objective of the project was to house the entire Agency under one roof. As the planning stage continued to meet obstacles, the Agency expanded; and by the time the Headquarters Building was finally ready for occupancy, in September 1961, it was already too small to accommodate all elements of the Agency. Those elements, including Logistics, that were still occupying temporary quarters along the Potomac had to "find a home," so to speak; and this home was finally located in the Rosslyn area of Northern Virginia, some 7 miles from the Headquarters at Langley via the George Washington Parkway. Three 12-story office buildings -- Key, Magazine, and Ames -- located in this area were leased by the Agency and became home for many of its support elements. The Office of Logistics began moving into the Ames Building, at 1820 North Ft. Myer Drive, soon after the lease was signed on 24 January 1966, and by spring of that year "Main Log" had settled into its new home, occupying generally the top four floors of the building.

The final step in the consolidation of OL units was the

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construction of the Printing Services Building.\* Approximately [redacted] originally allocated for the construction of the Headquarters Building remained unobligated; and in March 1964 PSD recommended the use of these funds for the construction of a new printing plant across from the new building. At the time, PSD was operating from four separate locations, two of these located in the Headquarters Building. These two would remain in place; but

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[redacted] and Plant No. 2 (located in the South Building, 2430 E Street, N. W.) along with the Chief, PSD, and his staff, who occupied office space in Quarters Eye, were to be moved into the new plant. Congress authorized the expenditure, and the new plant was in full production by 13 September 1967. 78/\*\* Thus at the close of the period the OL with its staffs and divisions was in permanent quarters.

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\*This is not to overlook the move of LSD's garage and motor pool facilities from [redacted] to its new quarters in [redacted] in November 1970. Included in the BPS's Master Plan is a proposal to construct new garage facilities at Langley adjacent to the Headquarters Building.

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\*\*There is no intent to slight the many advances in the field of printing and especially graphics made by PSD. The full story of the accomplishments of this unit may be found in source 78, Printing for Intelligence 1942-1968.

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period also saw the virtual elimination of all major overseas support facilities.

3. Support Operations

By the mid-1950's the major projects inspired initially by OPC had quietly died. With the success in Guatemala

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[redacted]  
[redacted] large-scale logis-

tical support was no longer required. Viewed in retrospect, 1956 was probably the turning point for large-scale anti-Communist programs, if one considers the events of the year and the US reaction to those events. Early in the year, in February, Premier Khrushchev denounced the crimes of Stalin before the 20th Soviet Congress. Riots erupted in Soviet Georgia in March and in Poznan, Poland, in June -- both suppressed with heavy casualties. The

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[redacted] was denounced by the Soviets on 23 April. In July President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, bringing invasion by Israel on 29 October and intervention by France and the United Kingdom on the Israeli side. Also in October the Hungarian Revolt occurred -- to be crushed by

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intervention of the Soviet armed forces. Except for diplomatic maneuvers, the US did little to involve itself in any of these events. It proved, especially to Agency planners, that large-scale use of guerrilla forces and other types of PM activities against the Communists in eastern Europe were not in the cards. One event that was to have a momentous impact upon the Agency and OL occurred, little noticed, on 30 November of that same year: Fidel Castro's revolutionary band landed in Cuba's Oriente Province.

Although the late 1950's were devoid of major operations, one event that occurred was to have a significant impact upon the supply operations of the OL. The time was the summer of 1958, and the US Government was on the verge of intervention in

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Fidel Castro's forces took control of the Island from the dictator Batista. After the shouting and rejoicing died down, the US Government awoke to the fact that a Communist state had been established virtually on its doorstep. On 17 March 1960 President Eisenhower approved the basic plan for the replacement of the Castro regime.<sup>79/\*</sup> This decision unleashed a chain of events which, because of its ultimate failure, still elicits heated discussion. Regardless of the final outcome, the study of these events does reveal that the OL performed in an outstanding manner a mission for which it was neither manned nor equipped. Moreover, after the mission failed, OL succeeded in salvaging some 5,000 tons of unused supplies.

To set the stage, the first of many problems encountered was the fact that no project outline was ever prepared, and OL was without specific guidance as to the quantities and types of materiel required to support the operation. OL also faced a shortage of personnel as the project developed. In April 1960,  Logistics

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\*Source 79, Logistics Support  March 1960 - October 1961, is the primary source for this discussion. Interested readers are referred to the basic document for the full story of the

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personnel were assigned full-time duties in support of Project

25X1A JMARC (later renamed [redacted] By December this figure had

25X9 increased to [redacted] and by the time of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs

in April 1961, the number of logisticians supporting the project

25X9 stood at [redacted] At the same time that OL was contributing this large

force of expertise, the workload at "Main Log" was reflecting

the tempo of the effort in the form of increasing requisitions,

procurements -- of some 14,000 line items furnished, 6,000

represented new procurements\* -- and packaging and shipping

requirements.

The packing and crating function was particularly sensitive because of the requirement of maintaining plausible denial on the part of the US Government. One example of this was the requirement to [redacted]

25X1C [redacted] To accomplish this task, clerical and administrative

personnel were pulled from OL and the OP's Replacement Pool and

25X1 detailed to [redacted] for 2- to 3-week periods during


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\*OL stocks some 17,000 line items and this figure has remained relatively constant over the years. In comparison, a US nuclear submarine requires 30,000 line items to maintain its serviceability.

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March 1961 to work under the supervision of Depot packers. By invasion day, 17 April 1961, OL had acquired, processed, packed, and shipped 8,000 tons of supplies to JMARC support, training, operational, and strike bases; of this quantity, 4,200 tons was for the invasion force and the remainder for training and guerrilla warfare requirements.

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\*In addition to source 80, see unpublished monograph on this subject written by [redacted] on file in RECD and OL/PS.

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overflowing river, inefficient and poorly motivated labor, a high incidence of equipment breakdown, extremely poor subgrade, customs delays, and some host country politics.

Although the mission was accomplished against almost impossible odds, the reputation of OL (and of [redacted] in particular) suffered because of a cost overrun. Estimated to cost

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[redacted]  
the fact that equipment was flown in from four countries, that the force labored 20 hours a day 7 days a week, and that many other obstacles were overcome, the cost overrun seemed to stick in the minds of Headquarters officers.

25X1A C. [redacted] A/DDP/A, probably the most vehement critic of the OL effort, stated in a memorandum for the DDP:

In view of Mr. [redacted] performance with respect to letting us know what was happening, I am not too happy about accepting his views.

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Why was Headquarters not informed sooner that a large cost increase might be expected? The responsibility for this - in my opinion - descends directly on Mr. [redacted] who was the staff engineer assigned to the job and comes from Garrisons [sic] [D/L] shop. He says that the work was progressing so rapidly that the bills were way behind and, consequently, it

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was very difficult to know exactly where the costs stood at any given moment. I don't think that this is a satisfactory answer since it must have been clear fairly early in the job that a significant overage would occur even though the exact amount would have been unknown. My suggestion would be to report this fact to Garrison which may prove pretty hard on Mr. [redacted] but, nevertheless, I think that the report should be made. Prior to doing so, I would be inclined to advise Mr. [redacted] of our intentions. 81/

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Placed in perspective, the story of [redacted] was a classic example of field versus Headquarters -- a lone engineer fighting a deadline complicated by rain, mosquitoes, floods, and all the other problems versus the stereotype of the Headquarters manager -- both "right" but each lacking an understanding of the other's problems.

The 3-day invasion began on 17 April 1961 and ended in ignominious defeat for the anti-Castro forces -- [redacted]

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invading force [redacted] were captured. During the invasion Logistics personnel loaded C-54's for airdrops -- 30,000 pounds were actually delivered to the beachhead -- and were standing by at the [redacted] with additional ammunition, but that requirement was canceled on 19 April. In the aftermath OL was faced with the

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problem of turning back to their owners some eight ships and

disposing of or reclaiming the residue of materiel. [redacted]

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was given [redacted] worth of supplies and equipment for its coop-

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eration, and [redacted] received another [redacted] worth for its

helpfulness. The remainder, 5,000 tons, was returned to [redacted]

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[redacted] Summing up the events of this period, Mr. [redacted]

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[redacted] author of the OL history on the subject, \* states:

...it is now clear that the task which was given to OL was far beyond the Agency's internal support capability... There was never a basic plan developed by the project which would have aided logistics in its approach to meeting the commitment.

At the same time that OL was occupied with the [redacted]

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project, world events were creating for OL, the Agency, and

indeed the US Government another challenge, which occupied much

of the national effort throughout the decade of the 1960's. On

9 March 1961 President John F. Kennedy authorized an offensive

program in Laos directed against the North Vietnamese-backed

Pathet Lao.<sup>82/</sup> After the signing of the Geneva Accords -- which

prohibited foreign military forces in the country -- in 1962, the

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\*See source 79.

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technicians, and nearly [redacted] Vietnamese employees. In addition to the main supply base established at Saigon and its environs, subdepots were operated at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, and, during the period of the RDC program, [redacted]

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The RDC program was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (MACV) on 1 July 1969, and the days of large-scale activity declined markedly after that date. The operations in Vietnam are significant not only because of the scale on which

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they were run -- FY 1966 saw a high point when requisitions totaling [redacted] were processed -- but also because of the scope of the activity.

Units such as RDC and PRU not only were equipped with weapons and administrative supplies but procurement actions also were initiated through the [redacted] for a complete

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line of uniforms, headgear, and the Asian equivalent of the jungle boot for these units. These quartermaster items were manufactured, in Asiatic sizes, [redacted] -- black pajamas

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for RDC, tiger-stripe suits for PRU -- and shipped to Saigon for issue. A kit-concept was developed for RDC whereby [redacted] was furnished RDC team T/O's, and that station in turn put the

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necessary items to equip one team in a kit form and shipped the individual kits directly to the major distribution points -- Da Nang, Nha Trang, [redacted] and Saigon. Although the Audit reports were consistently critical of how the paperwork war was progressing (at least until the station was converted to a Type I installation in April 1967), the manner in which operational support was rendered received nothing but kudos from both operational and support personnel.

Looking back, the activities of this period in Laos and Vietnam constitute a record of remarkable achievement. Taking 1968 as the high-water mark, the OL was directly supporting an armed force of nearly [redacted] in Southeast Asia (SEA) with

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approximately [redacted] staff employees scattered in some [redacted] separate locations and with a budget for materiel of about [redacted]

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
locations and with a budget for materiel of about [redacted]

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#### 4. The Role of Technology

Although it is not considered an innovator in the technical field compared with such support services as communications, the OL has nonetheless made use of advancing technology to assist it in the performance of its mission. The leading element in this field has been PSD, which over the years has produced

some trend-setting innovations in the fields of printing and graphics. The most notable of PSD's contributions was the introduction of the EPIC system in 1967. This system employs computer-produced magnetic tape to prepare the type-setting and plates for the printing process and provide a capability for rapid changes, printouts, and reproduction on very short notice. 84/



If there is a shortcoming in OL's use of technology, it is in the area of computer application. Supply functions such as stock recordkeeping were put on an EAM system in 1953, and in 1960 this system was converted to one utilizing the computer. This conversion was made over the objections of both the D/L, Mr. James Garrison, and the Chief of the Supply Division, Mr. [redacted] The changeover was directed by the DDS,

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Colonel White. The OL's position was that even though the computer would materially improve operations, the particular system proposed was not a true technological advance because it consisted only of changing from one type of machinery to another without any corresponding increase in the quality of the output or product. In 1967 Mr. [redacted] then Chief of the Support Information Processing System (SIPS) staff, in a presentation to the Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (OPPB), summed up the problem succinctly:

Our present Support systems are antiquated and must be modernized. Their flexibility has long since been used up. Just as we were forced to go to punched cards in the 50's to keep up with the new, changing, and additional requirements for information and service, we were forced to go to the computer in the 60's. We converted punched cards to the RCA 501 Computer early in 1960. In a sense, we have first generation systems on second generation equipment in a third generation era.<sup>86/</sup>

Since the formation of the SIPS staff in 1965, the support services have been groping towards development of a new system designed to take advantage of the modern hardware available. The SIPS Task Force has 11 personnel slots that are filled by SL careerists -- eight actually on duty as of December 1971 -- in

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order to lend expert logistics advice to the program. There have been many projected dates for a systems "start-up," but even as this is written (May 1972) the system is yet to "go on the air."

IV. In Retrospect

It is difficult in a history of this type to determine what happenings and changes to include and which to ignore and, for that matter, when enough is enough. The purpose of this history has been to trace the growth of the OL during the past 25 years and portray its significant activities. The initial years were ones of explosive growth with a concomitant amount of confusion. These were years of attempting to satisfy requirements using the empirical approach to achieve solutions. Money was plentiful, and the management of resources had a lower priority than getting the job done. Because of the separate paths followed by OSO and OPC, the logistics functions were fragmented, procedures were dissimilar, and authorities and responsibilities were confused; in short, the logistics effort appeared to be in an administrative mess.

The marriage of OSO and OPC, although a reluctant one, not only proved beneficial to the CS but also allowed a sorting out of support responsibilities, including logistics, which had not been possible before. Realizing the looseness that had been inherent in the previous system, managers began to crank out controls,

procedures, and SOP's in an attempt to tighten the reins and actually perform a management function. As time passed, it was recognized that the system was beginning to choke on its own red tape, and a slow but steady loosening of the reins began. At the end of the period the Office appears to have achieved a balance, staffed with experienced professionals capable of responding to wide-ranging requirements.

Appendix A. Chronology

20 Sep 45	President Truman issues Executive Order establishing SSU, effective 1 Oct.
22 Jan 46	Presidential Directive establishes CIG under the authority of the NIA.
1 Nov 46	SSU property assets are absorbed by the CIG.
22 Nov 46	Personnel and Administration Branch is established within CIG.
18 Jun 47	Personnel and Administration Branch is renamed the Executive for Administration and Management, effective 1 July.
Jul 47	Services Division, under the Executive for Administration and Management is elevated to Branch status.
18 Sep 47	The 'birthday' of CIA.
1 Sep 48	The Office of Policy Coordination is created as an instrument of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division and satellite on CIA for administrative support.
31 Dec 48	Executive for Administration and Management is abolished and replaced by the Executive, CIA; Chief, Services Branch, becomes the Services Officer.

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20 Jun 49	Congress passes Public Law 110 -- the CIA Act of 1949.
1 Oct 49	Services Office is abolished and in its place two separate staffs -- Administrative Support Staff and the Covert Support Staff -- are formed.
1 Dec 50	The CIA Executive becomes the Deputy Director for Administration. As part of reorganization, the Admin- istrative and Special Support Staffs are replaced by the Administrative Services Office and the Procurement Office, respectively.
Mar 51	First contract purchase of foreign arms is negotiated.

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Dec 51 General Services Office replaces Administrative Services Office.

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1. **What is the primary purpose of the study?**

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5 Aug 52

Procurement and Supply Offices absorb transportation functions from General Services Office.

Sep 52

Logistics officers of the Office of Policy Coordination are transferred to Procurement and Supply Office.

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Feb 53

Supply records are converted to Electric Accounting Machine system.

20 Mar 53

Logistics Office is established and the Procurement and Supply Office is abolished. Mr. James A. Garrison appointed Chief of Logistics.

May 53

Logistics Career Service Board is established.

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9 Nov 53

First Logistics Support Course begins.

15 Feb 54

Office of General Services is abolished, remainder of functions transferred to the Logistics Office.

17 Jun 54

Agency supplied and equipped force invades Guatemala.

21 Jul 54

Logistics Office retitled Office of Logistics. Mr. James A. Garrison continues as Director of Logistics.

3 Feb 55

Deputy Director for Administration is renamed Deputy Director for Support.

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Apr 55 Table of Vehicular Allowance system is initiated to control acquisition, use, and disposal of Agency vehicles.

Dec 55 Building Planning Staff is created to coordinate planning and construction of new CIA building (dissolved on 29 June 1962 and revived on 2 April 1969).

24 Oct 56 Position of Executive Officer is established within the Office of Logistics.

1 Jan 59 Fidel Castro assumes control of Cuba.

25 Sep 59

[REDACTED] 25X1A  
established as subordinate element  
of Procurement Division, Office of  
Logistics.

3 Nov 59

President Eisenhower lays corner-  
stone for Langley Headquarters  
Building.

17 Mar 60

President Eisenhower approves basic  
plan for the replacement of the Castro  
regime.

9 Mar 61

President Kennedy authorizes offen-  
sive action against the Pathet Lao in  
Laos.

18 Sep 61

[REDACTED] 25X1C  
Movement into new Headquarters  
Building begins.

5 Sep 62

Logistics Services Division is created  
as subordinate element of Office of  
Logistics.

1 Jul 63

[REDACTED] 25X1A  
Agency Paramilitary activities in  
Vietnam are transferred to US Army  
(SWITCHBACK).

18 Sep 64

Mr. James A. Garrison retires.  
Mr. Alan M. Warfield appointed  
Director of Logistics.

1964



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
10 Jul 65

Mr. Alan M. Warfield reassigned.  
Mr. George E. Meloon appointed  
Director of Logistics.

24 Jan 66

Ames Building is occupied by the  
Office of Logistics.


1966



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16 Mar 66

The Transportation Division is  
dissolved and its functions split  
between Supply Division, Office of  
Logistics, and the Office of Personnel.



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22 Aug 67

Director of Logistics delegates  
contracting-officer authority to  
Technical Services Division, DDP.

Sep 67

Agency Contract Review Board,  
chaired by Deputy Director of Logis-  
tics, is established to review R&D  
contracts in excess of \$150,000.

13 Sep 67

New Printing Services Division plant  
commences operations.

1 Mar 68

Director of Logistics delegates con-  
tracting-officer authority to Office  
of Elint, DD/S&T.

26 Feb 69

Director of Logistics delegates contracting-officer authority to Office of Research and Development, DD/S&T, and to the National Photographic Interpretation Center, DDI.

1 Jul 69

Revolutionary Development Cadres program is transferred from CIA control to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

5 Jan 70

Mr. George E. Meloon retires.  
Mr. John F. Blake appointed Director of Logistics.

17 Apr 70

Procurement Management Staff is created to advise independent contracting officers and also assumes staff supervision of [redacted] Procurement Office.

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3. Exchange of Memos, DCI (Vandenberg) and Director, SSU (Quinn), 1 and 2 Nov 46, subj: Transfer of Property, Supplies, and Equipment. C. HS/CSG 400. \*
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7. File of CIG and Component Organizational Charts, 15 Oct 47. S. HS/HC-631.
8. "The Historical Record of the Procurement and Supply Office" (5, above). S.
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\*All documents followed by "HS" code are on file with or available through the DCI - Historical Staff; other documents are available in OL, or as indicated.

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17. CIA Gen Order No. [redacted] 20 Sep 49. S.

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24. Ibid.

25X1A 25. Memo for Mr. [redacted] from SSA/ADPC, 28 Nov 50, subj: Logistics Support for OPC Operations. S. HS/CSG 1431.

26. Ibid.

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25X1A 31. Ibid.

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25X1A 38. [redacted] 25X1A

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47. Letter from Lt. Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, DCI to Mr. W. E. Reynolds, Commissioner of Public Buildings Service, Federal Works Agency. U.
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60. CIA Notice No. [REDACTED] 8 Feb 54 and CIA Regulation No. [REDACTED] Change 1, 12 Mar 54. S.

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